

Ottoman Methods of Conquest

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## OTTOMAN METHODS OF CONQUEST (\*)

### (1) *The Method of Gradual Conquest.*

It appears that in the Ottoman conquests there were two distinct stages that were applied almost systematically. The Ottomans first sought to establish some sort of suzerainty over the neighbouring states. They then sought direct control over these countries by the elimination of the native dynasties. Direct control by the Ottomans meant basically the application of the *timar* system which was based upon a methodical recording of the population and resources of the countries in the *defters* (official registers). The establishment of the *timar* system did not necessarily mean a revolutionary change in the former social and economic order. It was in fact a conservative reconciliation of local conditions and classes with Ottoman institutions which aimed at gradual assimilation.

The use of these two stages in the gradual achievement of the Ottoman conquests can be detected from the beginning of Ottoman history. For example, the relationship of Osman Gâzi, the founder of the dynasty, with Köse Mihal (Koze Michael) the local lord of Harmankaya (Chirmenkia), with Samsama Chawush and other *tekvîours* appears first to have been in the nature of an alliance, then of a vassalage <sup>(1)</sup>. This was most probably due to the particular military organization in the

(\*) I wish to express my thanks to Mr. D. Sherinian and Mr. Th. Buchanan for the help they gave me in translating this paper from the Turkish.

(1) See my *Stefan Dusan dan Osmanli Imparatorlugu*, in *Mélanges Fuad Köprülü*, Istanbul, 1953, pp. 211-212.

*uc*, borderlands in which there were overlords (*uc-emîri*) and vassal lords (*bey*) <sup>(1)</sup>. At any rate, in the 14 th century we see many small states being incorporated into the Ottoman state after a more or less long period of vassalage. When Bayezid I (1389-1403) became Sultan on the battlefield of Kossovo there were many vassal rulers such as the Byzantine Emperor (vassa I since 1373), the Bulgarian princes (vassals since 1371), the Serbian princes in Serbia and in Macedonia (vassals since 1372), and the local lords in Albania (vassals since 1385), in Greece and in the Aegean islands. In Anatolia, not only the *gâzi* principalities in the West but also the Karamanids in Konya were Ottoman vassals.

Sultan Bayezid I inaugurated a new policy by establishing direct control over these vassal countries in a number of swift military expeditions. He was afforded the opportunity to achieve this by the revolt of the Anatolian principalities at his accession to the throne and the cooperation of the vassal Bulgarian king with the enemy Hungarians. He drove out the local dynasties and brought these countries under direct rule. It is interesting to note that at the famous meeting of Serres, when Bayezid gathered together most of the vassal Balkan princes, there were rumours that for a moment he considered executing them <sup>(2)</sup>. Bayezid also saw the importance of the imperial city of Constantinople in building a unified empire from the Danube to the Euphrates. Thus he erected the Castle of Akcha-hisar (*Anadolu-hisari*) on the Bosphorus and attempted a conquest of the city <sup>(3)</sup>. What is particularly interesting for us is the reaction that showed itself, not only in the conquered lands but also in the Ottoman state itself, against this violent and hasty policy of annexation during and after Bayezid's reign. This policy was considered as being against the good Ottoman tradition. The two points of view, that of hasty and that of gradual expansion, are apparent in Bayezid's time in the differences between Chan-

(1) See F. Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*, Paris 1935, p. 89.

(2) See Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, Paris 1932.

(3) See my *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tedkikler ve Vesikalar*, Ankara 1954, p. 122.

darli Ali Pasha and Hodja Firuz Pasha. About half a century later, Chandarli Halil Pasha still criticised in the strongest terms Hodja Firuz's policy of unscrupulous war. The popular Ottoman tradition which criticised Bayezid's government also complained bitterly of his introduction into the Ottoman administrative system of the new fiscal method of a central government using *defters*. We shall see that the *defter* was the basic tool of the Ottoman government. Bayezid also attempted to make radical changes in the newly conquered lands in Anatolia, replacing the native aristocracy by his slaves (*gûlâm*) <sup>(1)</sup>. His forceful policy of unification, which caused this vigorous reaction, was the real cause of the subsequent collapse of his empire in 1402. In fact, adopting fully the old Islamic and Ilkhanid methods of administration Bayezid was responsible for the development of the semi-feudal state of Osman Gâzî and Orhan Gâzî with its vassals and powerful *uc-beyis* (chiefs in the military frontier-zone), into a real Islamic Sultanate with traditional institutions. It was during the same period that "the army of the Porte" (*Kapi-kulu*), the instrument of central power, was strengthened and gained significance in the state <sup>(2)</sup>. After the destruction of Bayezid's empire by Timur in 1402 the remnants of his system of government contributed most significantly to the restoration of the empire. Let me only mention the existence of *defters* of *timars* in the Ottoman capital which guaranteed the legal titles to them, and, thus, the *timar*-holders who had obtained them from Bayezid in the newly conquered lands were most interested in the reunification of these lands under the Ottoman Sultan. Thus, it is seen that Bayezid's efforts were not all in vain <sup>(3)</sup>.

Bayezid's successors, Süleyman I, Mehmed I and Murad II, resumed the conservative policy and respected the existence

(1) See below, pp. 120-122.

(2) See Ashîk Pashazâde, ed. Ali, Istanbul 1332, p. 78.

(3) P. Wittek (*De la défaite d'Ankara à la prise de Constantinople*, REI, 1938), too, considered the premature character of Bayezid's empire as a cause of its fall.

of the restored principalities in old Turkish Anatolia <sup>(1)</sup> and of the small states in the Balkans. When the Ottomans found it necessary to act against these Moslem states, they did their best to justify such actions in the eyes of the Islamic world. There were several good reasons for this conservative policy, such as the existence of Ottoman pretenders to the throne in Constantinople <sup>(2)</sup>, the threat of a new invasion from the East, and the fear of a crusade from the west. The Chandarlis, an old Ottoman family of Vizirs who had acquired an absolute authority in state affairs, were primarily responsible for this policy, the Grand Vizir Chandarli Halil Pasha (1429-1453) being a particularly strong advocate of it. The restoration of Serbia in 1444 and the maintenance of peace with Byzantium demonstrated strikingly Chandarli Halil Pasha's policy. In order to promote this policy of peace and reconciliation he was forced to struggle against a new military group which gathered around the young Sultan Mehmed II in 1444. After the success of this military group with the conquest of Constantinople in 1453, Chandarli Halil was eliminated, and the policy of unification by conquest prevailed once more. It appears that the conditions at the time justified such a policy. The period after the conclusion of Union between Rome and Constantinople in 1439 was critical. Mehmed II having been deposed in 1446 and his warlike advisers having been eliminated from the government, it was evident to him upon his second accession to the throne in 1451 that the conquest was a necessity for the firm establishment of his own position as well as for the future of the Ottoman Empire <sup>(3)</sup>.

(1) Divided again into the former principalities under their old dynasties, Western Anatolia no longer enjoyed the benefits of safety and large-scale *gâzi* activities which it had known under Ottoman rule. Therefore Murad II reconquered these principalities without great difficulty (1423). The Ottoman Sultans as the real successors of the ancient *uc-emîris* could easily claim the areas beyond the historical boundaries of the former Seldjuk state, which had been conquered by the *gâzis*, the frontier warriors.

(2) First, Mustafa, Bayezid's son, attempted to seize the throne in 1416 and in 1421. Then Orhan Chelebi, most likely a grandson of Bayezid I, became active in Indjégiz and Dobrudja in 1444. It would be safe to say that the struggle for the throne among the descendants of Bayezid I ended only after the conquest of Constantinople (see my *Fatih devri*, pp. 69-70).

(3) See for all these developments in 1443-1453 my *Fatih Devri*.

We have seen that the Ottoman conquest in two stages was essentially a product of historical conditions. The tradition survived even beyond the Conqueror's successful activity of unification, which was achieved by an uninterrupted series of expeditions. Let us note, for example, Sultan Süleyman's policy toward Hungary. On the other hand, a policy of gradual incorporation continued even after the establishment of direct rule. This will be dealt with subsequently.

(2) *The Statistical Survey of the Conquered Lands.*

Before the army of conquest was withdrawn, small garrisons were immediately placed in several fortresses of strategic importance. Then the remaining fortresses were often demolished by special order of the Sultan. This measure, which was often applied by the Ottomans, was taken firstly in order to avoid the necessity of maintaining forces in them, and secondly in order to prevent a reemergence of centres of resistance under local lords. Then as a rule *sipâhis* (cavalrymen) who composed the main force of the Ottoman army were given *timars* in the villages throughout the newly conquered country. Some of these, with the name *hisar-eri* or *kale-eri*, were stationed in the fortresses as well. These *hisar-eris* constituted the real military force in most of the fortresses in the 15 th Century. Apparently as a security measure these regular forces were recruited from distant parts of the Empire. According to the record-books the majority of *hisar-eris* in Anatolia came from Rum-ili (the Balkans), and in Rum-ili from Anatolia.

Even with a limited number of fortified places the Ottomans found it necessary to employ the native population as auxiliary forces, otherwise a large part of the Ottoman army would have had to remain inactive in hundreds of fortresses throughout the Empire. The faithfulness of these native forces was encouraged by special privileges, such as exemption from certain taxes. Such privileges, however, were not granted permanently

and could be withdrawn at the pleasure of the Sultan <sup>(1)</sup>. Furthermore, the auxiliary forces in the fortresses were, as we saw, always accompanied by regular Ottoman soldiers. In some special cases the population of a whole town was given exemption from taxes to insure continued faithfulness. For instance, in the record-books of Konya and Kayseri <sup>(2)</sup> it is stated that the population of these cities was exempt from taxes altogether, "on account of the faithfulness which they had shown during the wars with Uzun Hasan", and indeed it was by such favours that the Ottomans kept these important cities in their hands. The population of Akchahisar (Croña) in Albania enjoyed exemption from tax before the invasion by Iskender Bey, in return for the guardianship of the fortress <sup>(3)</sup>.

The conquered lands which were usually preserved in their pre-Ottoman administrative boundaries <sup>(4)</sup>, were entrusted to one or several *sancak beyis*, according to the size of these territories. A *sancak* was the real administrative and military unit of the empire, and the *sancak beyi* was primarily the commander of the *timar*-holders in his *sancak*. His main responsibilities were to lead his timariots in war, to secure public order, and to execute legal and governmental decisions. Decisions on all legal affairs in the sanjak, including those concerning the military (*'askerî*), were the exclusive responsibility of the *kâdis* who were independent from the *sancak beyis*. The *sancak* was divided into *vilâyets* under a *subashi* who was a subordinate of the *sancak beyi*, with the same responsibilities. In Ashik Pashazâde <sup>(5)</sup>, whose source was written toward the end of the 14th century, we find statements about Osman Gâzî appointing *kâdis* and *subashis* in the newly conquered towns. In fact, according to the *defter* of Albania of 1431, every town had a *kâdî* and a *subashi*. What is interesting to note is that the

(1) See *Fatih Devri*, p. 163, 180.

(2) *İstanbul Başvekalet Arşiv Umum Müdürlüğü*, *Tapu defterleri* N° 40 (Konya), N° 33 (Kayseri).

(3) See *Arvanid Sancağı Defteri*, my edition, Ankara 1954, p. 103.

(4) See *Fatih Devri*, p. 181.

(5) Ali's edition, *İstanbul* 1332, pp. 18-20.

kâdîs in the same defter were granted *timars* as a salary, which indicates further the significance of the *timar* system in the provincial administration during this period.

The *vilâyet tahriri* was the basis of Ottoman administration. It consisted of assessing all taxable resources on the spot and of recording the data in record books called *defter-i hâkânî* (Imperial Register). These *defters* were then used in appropriating certain districts to the military for the collection of taxes which were to be their pay. Not only did the *defters* determine the amount of taxes due from the individual peasants, they were also used as official land records which established legal claims to land.

The oldest available *defters* of this kind in the Turkish archives are those relating to Albania, dated 835 A. H. (1431-1432)<sup>(1)</sup>. The records in the defter of Premedi-Görice (Koritsa) indicate clearly that an earlier record of this area was made in the time of Bayezid I (1389-1403), whereas the area north of it appears to have been assessed only in the time of Mehmed I (1413-1421). These earlier assessments must have been made almost immediately after the respective conquests of these areas by the Ottomans<sup>(2)</sup>. There are also indications in a *defter* of Ankara dated 868 A. H.<sup>(3)</sup>, concerning an assessment of this province made by Timurtash Pasha who was, we know, its governor at about 1396. The old anonymous popular chronicles criticised the ulemâ severely for their introduction of the *defter* system into the Ottoman dominion<sup>(4)</sup>. Taken together with the accounts in the *defters* which I have mentioned, this indirect allusion might be considered as additional evidence concerning the real beginning of the *tahrir* system in the Ottoman state. On the other hand, the chronicler Ashik Pashazâde refers to a *tahrir* of Karasi after its conquest in the time of Orhan Gâzî (1326 ?-1361)<sup>(5)</sup>. This by itself is not adequate

(1) See my *Arvanid Defteri*, Giris, p. I.

(2) *Ibid.*, pp. III-v.

(3) Başvekâlet Archives, Maliye def. N° 9.

(4) *Tevârih-i Al-i Osman*, ed. I. H. Ertaylan, p. 47.

(5) Ali's edition, p. 45.



evidence for concluding that the system existed in this period ; but we find well developed Turkish formulas and terminology in the *defters* of 1431, which were the same even two centuries later. This might indicate that the *tahrîr* system had been used over a long period of time before Bayezid I. We know, moreover, the existence of a highly developed Ottoman chancery even in the time of Orhan Gâzi <sup>(1)</sup>. Lastly in the *defters* of 1431 occur many formulas in Persian that might indicate a Persian-Ilkhanid or Seldjukid origin of the system.

We have two decrees dated 983 A. H. (1575 A. D.), containing instructions to the officials in charge of a *tahrîr* of the Eastern provinces in Anatolia <sup>(2)</sup> which had been conquered about sixty years earlier. These decrees which give us a perfect idea of how the *tahrîrs* were carried out, can be summarized as follows : 1. An *emîn* was appointed for the task. He was assisted by a clerk (*kâtib*) who was under his authority and who drew up the records and recorded the data in the *defter*. Each of them was authorized to collect one *akcha* per household in the districts recorded in order to meet their expenses during the *tahrîr*. 2. The *emîn* collected data on population, land under cultivation, vineyards, orchards, etc., in short all the data upon which taxation was based. He was to be assisted and supervised in each district by the local *kâdî*. 3. Before beginning the assessment of a particular district the *emîn* gathered together all the *timar*-holders or their trustees and instructed them to hand him various legal documents in their possession, i. e. *berâts* (imperial decrees acknowledging their title to *timars* or to tax exemption), *sûret -i defters* (official copies of the record of their *timars* in a previous register), *temessüks* (documents given by the public authorities concerning *timars* or tax exemptions), and *mahsulât defteris* (documents stating the amounts of specific taxes). 4. Then the *emîn*, going from village to village, began his inspection on the spot, comparing the current data with the pre-

(1) See the *mülknâme* of Orhan Gâzi, *Arslan Kervanu*, I, p. 277.

(2) *Münshedd*, British Museum, Rieu, Or. 9503, pp. 36-41, 46-51 ; cf. Ö. L. Barkan, *İktisat Fakültesi Mecmuası*, II, 1, pp. 39-44.

vious records. 5. Every *timar*-holder was instructed to bring all the adults in his *timar* before the *emîn* who was to record their names. The result of this survey, compiled in the form of a book (*defter*), was to be submitted to the Sultan who confirmed it after examination. 5. The *defters of Cizye* (capitation paid only by adult non-Muslims) and of '*avârîz* (an emergency tax) were to be drawn up separately by the *kâdîs* and to be submitted to the Sultan. 7. The *emîn* was also charged with reporting all particular local practices of taxation with special regard to differences in rates. These local practices, after examination and confirmation by the Sultan, were recorded on the first page of the *defter* as the *kanûnnâme* (the fiscal law) of the *sancak* concerned. 8. The *emîn* was instructed also to make a report of all *timar*-holders and their retainers (*cebelu*) in the *sancak*. Then a redistribution of *timars* was to be made according to their titles, and compiled in a separate *defter*.

This description of a *tahrîr* made in the the 16th century appears to be the same as that used in the 15th century according to the evidence provided by the *defters* of 1431 <sup>(1)</sup>. Also the first *tahrîr* of a country after its conquest must have been made in the same manner. This is substantiated by the *defters* we have today of Eastern Anatolia and Cyprus, made immediately after their conquests in 1518 and 1572 respectively.

It is reasonable to expect that for the first *tahrîr* of a country after its conquest the *emîn* was assisted by the military occupying the country as well as by the natives. It is well known that in the 15th Century there were Christians or converts employed as *kâtîbs*, such as Dîmo, Yorgi, and Zaganuz son of Mankole, in the *defter* of Albania of 1431 <sup>(2)</sup>.

The *tahrîrs* were on rare occasions disturbed by native opposition as seen in Albania and in Zulkadriye <sup>(3)</sup>. In both cases the semi-nomadic and feudal organization of the country was principally responsible for the disturbances, and it is to be

(1) *Arvanid defteri*, p. xii.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. vii.

(3) *Kemâl Pashazâde*.

noted that the *tahrir* of 1431 in Albania was the real start of the long struggle of the mountaineers under native feudal chiefs such as Araniti and Thopia Zenebissi first, and then Iskender Bey Kastrioti (1).

### (3) *Assimilation and Creation of the Empire.*

We have seen that two kinds of defters were compiled after the *tahrir*. The first indicated the taxes, specifying their sources in detail (*mufassal defter*). The second indicated the distribution of the revenue among the military class (*icmâl defteri*). This distinction corresponded to a fundamental principle of the Ottoman state.

In the Empire there were two principal classes : the *re'âyâ* (subjects), and the '*askerî* (the military). In principle the '*askerî* included not only the army, but also all public servants and the members of their households. They were paid by the Sultan and exempt from taxation. Thus, the ruled were sharply distinguished from the rulers and it is little wonder if most twentieth century minds find it difficult to grasp this peculiar concept of state based principally on the idea of conquest. It must be immediately added that the '*askerî* were not an aristocratic class with historically established rights, but membership of it was contingent upon the will of the Sultan. We will see, however, that this did not prevent the Ottoman sultans from adopting in the beginning a conciliatory conservative policy toward the pre-conquest aristocratic groups.

According to Ottoman theory all subjects and lands within the realm belonged to the Sultan. This principle abolished all local and inherited rights and privileges in the Empire, and it was formulated essentially in order to confirm the Sultan's absolute authority and to show that all rights stem from his will. Only the Sultan's special decrees, called *berât*, established

(1) See my *Timariotes chrétiens en Albanie au xv<sup>e</sup> siècle*, in *Mitt. d. Österr. Staatsarchivs*, Bd. IV, 1952, 120-128.

rights not only to official commissions, but also to all land titles including endowments (*wakfs*). All commissions and rights became invalid at the death of the reigning Sultan. There was real meaning in the expression : "the Sultan was the state itself".

Thus, the absolute power of the Sultan called for an executive body with absolute fidelity to him. The only source of authority was his will and delegation. Consequently, those who were in the service of the Sultan or who exercised authority in his name, the '*askerî*', were considered a separate and distinct group above the rest of the population. Although the civil and penal laws, based on Islamic law, were essentially the same for the *re'âyâ* and the '*askerî*', the latter were subject to a special law, *kanûn-i sipâhiyân*, created by the Sultan's will. The rule that a *ra'îyyet* (subject) could not be admitted directly into the '*askerî*' was considered one of the organic laws of the Empire. However, the Sultan could by decree elevate a *ra'îyyet* into the '*askerî*' class if he fulfilled certain qualifications, such as the performance of an outstanding military deed. Similarly the Sultan could deprive an '*askerî*' of his status by an edict. The class nature of the '*askerî*' was further demonstrated by the fact that when an '*askerî*' was merely dismissed from his post he continued to belong to the '*askerî*' and as such was eligible for an office at any future time. Only if upon dismissal he adopted a non-governmental occupation, was he definitely deprived of his '*askerî*' status. Also any bey or pasha who was dismissed from his position received compensation until he was appointed to a new post. It is noteworthy that when under certain circumstances the sons of '*askerî*' were included in the record books as *re'âyâ*, they were listed in a separate category indicating their military origin.

The Ottoman record-books of the 15th Century show that not only many Ottoman Beys in the government of the provinces but also a considerable number of timariots in the main Ottoman army during the 15th Century were direct descendants of the pre-Ottoman local military classes or nobility. It is rather

surprising to find that in some areas in the 15th century approximately half of the timariots were Christians : 62 timariots out of a total of 125 in the district of Branicheva in 1468, 60 timariots out of a total 335 in Albania in 1431, and 36 out of 182 in the province of Tirhala (in Thessaly) in 1455 were Christians<sup>(1)</sup>. These proportions were no doubt higher in these areas in the first years after the conquest. An especially illustrative record concerning such a timar is the following : "Because the sancak-beyi reported that the rights to the *hisse* (portion) of a *timar* belonging to the aforesaid Mehmed have been revoked, they were given to the Christian Ivradko, for he was originally, it is said, a *sipâhî* and proved himself devoted in the service of the Sultan" <sup>(2)</sup>. For a Christian to be eligible to hold a *timar* we find here two clearly expressed qualifications : firstly, he must be of military origin, and secondly, he must have proved himself loyal to the Sultan. It should be noted that all these Christian timariots belonged originally to the military gentry of the previous Balkan states <sup>(3)</sup>.

During the same period and until the 16th century the Christian *voynuks* in Bosnia, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, Thessaly and Bulgaria were also incorporated into the Ottoman army, with the status of '*askerî* (military), in great numbers. For instance, in the district of Branicheva (Serbia) there were 217 *voynuks*, 503 *yamaks* (reserve candidates) and 61 *lagators* (officers), and in Tirhala, 103 *voynuks* and 203 *yamaks*. They were originally the Serbian *voynici* who had formed the numerous lesser nobility with their small properties (*bashtina*) in the empire of Stephan Dushan (1333-1355) <sup>(4)</sup>. The following document, one of the oldest and most interesting indications of their position in the Ottoman state, reads : "*Voy nuk* : Nikola, son of Dushik ; *Yamaks* : Gin and Milan and Dimitri ; as they were

(1) See *Stefan Duşandan...*, p. 230.

(2) *Ibid.*, p. 232.

(3) *Ibid.*, pp. 231-235.

(4) *Ibid.*, pp. 237-241.

the sons of former *sipâhîs* <sup>(1)</sup> they are registered as *voynuks* with the properties, vineyards and lands which are now in their possession. Recorded in Muharrem of the year 858 in Adrianople" <sup>(2)</sup>.

It should be noted that the incorporation of the Christian military groups into the Ottoman '*askerî*' class was facilitated, no doubt, by their previous experience as auxiliary forces of the Ottoman army during the vassalage of their countries. Seeing that their position and lands were effectively guaranteed by the strong Ottoman administration, the majority of these Christian soldiers must not have been averse to the change. No wonder that many Christian garrisons surrendered their castles without resistance and joined the Ottoman ranks. The conservative Ottoman policy and promise of *timars* surely attracted many of them. This is one explanation of the comparatively rapid expansion of Ottoman rule in the Balkans.

It is noteworthy that by the Sultan's decrees the Christian timariots and *voynuks* often maintained a position in the Ottoman state commensurate with their former social status. The Ottomans preserved to a great extent the land-holding rights of these people in the form of *timar* or *bashtina*. Thus, the great families (seigneurs, voyvods) frequently retained the greater part of their patrimonies as great Ottoman *timar*-holders, and when they adopted Islam they took the title of bey and were eligible for attaining the highest administrative posts. In a record book of about 1448 I came across one instance of a Christian, named Gergi Istepan, who had attained the position of *subashi* (the military and administrative head of a county) <sup>(3)</sup>. Although there were no Christian *sancak-beyis* (governors of provinces), we find many *sancak-beyis* from local Christian great families who were converts to Islam, such as Yakub Bey and Hamza Bey, governors of Albania in the time of Murad II

(1) This term should be translated here as military rather than as cavalryman.

(2) Başvekelet Archives, Maliye def. N° 303, Kircheva Defteri.

(3) All *subashis* bore the title of bey in the 15th century. As a rule, *timar*-holders below the rank of *subashi* were not allowed to use this title.

(1421-1451). Hamza Bey and Yakub Bey descended from the famous Albanian dynasties of Castriota and Muzaki respectively <sup>(1)</sup>. Christian *timar*-holders and their islamized descendants, although generally left on their inherited lands, were obliged to abandon part of their lands and their special feudal rights under the new Ottoman *timar* regime, the greatest families sustaining the greatest loss. These losses promoted some local resistance. It is apparent that the prolonged opposition of the Albanian chiefs led by Iskender Bey (Scanderbeg) was principally due to this <sup>(2)</sup>.

The noble families in the Balkan countries were assimilated to the mass of Ottoman timariots and became Muslim. Islamization was actually a psycho-social phenomenon among the Christian *sipâhis*, who were definitely the first converts in the Empire <sup>(3)</sup>. The state did not as a rule seek their conversion to Islam as a necessary prerequisite to enrolment in the Ottoman '*askerî*' class, and it did not even attempt to achieve such conversion by indirect methods. Thus, we find *timar* assignments to Christian soldiers even in the time of Bayezid II (1481-1512). But in the 16th century Christian timariots were rarely found in the same areas; what is more, in this century the existence of Christian timariots shocked the people and caused a special inquiry into their origin <sup>(4)</sup>. The previous Christian timariots had gradually adopted Islam and disappeared by the 16th century. In fact, the Christian origin of some of the timariots is only revealed by their rarely used family names such as Kurtik Mustafa in Albania, who was undoubtedly a descendant of the famous Slavo-Albanian lord, Pavlo Kurtik (Kurtić) <sup>(5)</sup>.

Bosnia presents a special case. The Ottomans maintained the old Bosnian nobility on their hereditary lands (*bashtina*), confirming their property rights which had been previously granted

(1) See my *Arnavudluk'ta Osmanli Hakimiyyetinin Yerleşmesi*, in *Istanbul ve Fatih*, II (1953).

(2) *Ibid.*

(3) See *Stefan Duşandan...*, pp. 231-233.; P. Wittek, *Yazitioghlu...*, *BSOAS*, XIV-3.

(4) *Stefan...*, p. 247, note 190.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 226.

by the Bosnian kings. Thus, in Bosnia the old nobility which gradually adopted Islam maintained themselves on their own hereditary lands until the 20th Century. That there was no pressure to adopt Islam, as a condition of having titles to land confirmed, has been shown convincingly in a study by C. Truhelka <sup>(1)</sup> and recently corroborated by Turkish documents <sup>(2)</sup>. It appears that the different developments in Serbia and Macedonia also came from pre-Ottoman conditions. In Serbia and Macedonia, part of the nobles did not possess *bashtinas* of the same type as in Bosnia. In Serbia and Macedonia the lands which the great nobles (*vlastelin*) possessed were of the nature of Byzantine fiefs (*pronija*). These were easily converted into ordinary *timar* lands by the Ottomans, and therefore they were subject to the general rules concerning *timar* <sup>(3)</sup>.

As to the *vognyuks*, because of their special status they were not exposed to the same social influences as were the Christian timariots, and therefore they preserved their Christian faith. When the *vognyuks* in the Ottoman army lost their military importance in the 16th century, they were reduced to the status of *re'âyâ* together with the similar Muslim military groups of *yaya* and *musellems*. Yet toward the end of the 15th century the famous historian Idrîs-i Bidlîsî mentions them as Christian soldiers forming an important part of the Ottoman army <sup>(4)</sup>. Later they survived in Bulgaria as Christian grooms in the service of the Imperial Stable <sup>(5)</sup>.

It is not necessary here to discuss other Christian soldiers of non-*'askerî* status such as *cerehors* who were occasional levies from the Christian population, or the Christian guardians in the fortresses and passes who were granted tax exemption. Actually, these groups enjoyed a special position between *re'âyâ* and *'askerî*.

(1) *Die Geschichtliche Grundlage der Bosnischen Agrarfrage*, Sarajevo 1911.

(2) See Stefan Duşandan..., pp. 236-240.

(3) See my *Timariotes*, pp. 130-131.

(4) See *Fatih Devri Üzerinde Tedkikler ve Vesikalar*, p. 177.

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 152.



Not only in the Balkans but also in Anatolia the same conservative policy was applied by the Ottomans. For example, according to the *defters* of the province of Karaman <sup>(1)</sup> which were compiled after the annexation of that principality, the great majority of the native aristocracy were maintained in their positions, often with their previous land rights. In the *defter* of 929 A. H. (1519 A. D.) mention is made of the old families of Karaman under this heading : "those *timar*-holders whose fathers were once the notables of Karaman...". Such people formed the majority of the *timar*-holders in this province. Here, too, the grandees took larger timars or *ze'âmet*s with the title of bey, and their children also were given large *timars* in various parts of the province. These principal families were Turgud, Kögez, Teke, Bozdogan, Samagar, Yapa, Egdir, Emeleddin, Bulgar, Adalibey, Uchari, Yasavul Musa, Bozkir, and others <sup>(2)</sup>. Most of these families provided the chiefs of the tribes in this area. We know that those tribes which were partially settled before the Ottoman conquest had formed the main force of the Karamanid army against the Ottomans. Now, the taxes of the several groups of the Yapalu tribe, which was undoubtedly a new tribal formation around a certain Yapa Bey within the larger tribal organization of Turgud, were granted as *timars* to the descendants of Yapa. Likewise the taxes of the tribes of Bektashlu became the *timars* of the descendants of a certain Bektash. Thus the chiefs were granted the taxes of their tribes as *timars* ; in other words the existing situation was merely confirmed as a peculiar variety of the *timar* system. This appeared to be the only way of establishing Ottoman rule in this area, because the native aristocracy had strong tribal ties and was always inclined to escape from Ottoman centralist administration. More than once they made common cause with the Karaman or Ottoman pretenders or even foreign powers such as the Mamelûks of Egypt or the Shahs of Iran. Shah Ismail (1500-1524)

(1) Başvekkâlet Archives, Tapu Defterleri N° 40, 32, 58, 63, 119, 392, Maliye Defter, N° 567.

(2) Some of these families are to be found in the semi-legendary history of Karaman by Shikâri.

became very powerful against the Ottomans in Anatolia by supporting these tribal organizations. The Ottoman government eventually overcame the rebellious attitude of the Karaman tribal aristocracy not by deportation or suppression, but by adjusting its system to the conditions. Time worked in favour of the Ottomans. The descendants of local *timar*-holders were granted new *timars* in the newly conquered lands in the neighbouring countries. In Zulkadriye province, annexed definitely in the first years of Süleyman the Magnificent, we find 35 timariots from Karaman and 6 from Ich-ili, as against 73 native timariots and 41 of unspecified origin. <sup>(1)</sup> Likewise, a number of timariots of Bosnian and Serbian origin were given *timars* in Hungary after its conquest. Thus, the new generations lost their local connexions and were assimilated into the vast army of timariots by further assignments. Incidentally, it should be added that this process of assimilation was accompanied by a gradual substitution of the native laws and customs by the Ottoman law and system of taxation <sup>(2)</sup>.

Finally, one might think that this Ottoman principle of absorbing into the '*askeri*' class only people of military or aristocratic origin might be connected with the *gâzî* origin of the Ottomans. It is known that the *gâzîs* formed a military organization of warriors of the faith in the borderlands, and the members of this organization were given special status by the Seldjukid Sultans. Moreover, they received a religious sanction from the holiest men of the time <sup>(3)</sup>. As has been pointed out, Osman

(1) Tapu Def. N° 392.

(2) See Ö. L. Barkan, *Kanûnlar*, Istanbul 1943, pp. LXII-LXX ; my *Stefan Duşandan...*, pp. 241-242 ; W. Hinz, *Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens im 15 und 16 Jahrh.*, ZDMG, Bd 100-1.

(3) See P. Wittek, *The Rise of the Ottoman Empire*, London 1938, pp. 33-51. Wittek was the first to stress the *gâzî* origin of the Ottoman dynasty, but he denied their tribal origin, while F. Köprülü tried to show their connection with the Kayı tribe (*Belleten* 28, pp. 219-313). Whatever specific tribe its origin might be, Osman's family seems to belong to a tribe in the *uc*, the borderland, which does not exclude the possibility of its belonging to the organization of *gâzîs*. We have not sufficient evidence to reject altogether the detailed account of Osman's semi-nomadic life as given by the old tradition. Similarly the *gâzî* chiefs of tribal origin in the Ottoman borderland in the 14 th and 15 th centuries, such as Pasha-yigit or Minnetoglu Mehmed Bey or perhaps Evrenos Bey, soon settled in the *uc* towns and became free from tribal ties. In Eastern Anatolia and Iran, chiefs of tribes founded strong states in the 15th Century.

Gâzî's first allies who later became his vassals, were local lords or military chiefs, Christian or Muslim <sup>(1)</sup>. In any case, the first Ottomans were a distinct group with a military tradition.

However, the local gentry was not the only source of the Ottoman ruling class even in the first period of Ottoman history. Another fundamental principle of the Ottoman government, which enabled the clients of the military class to obtain *timars* and offices, prevented it from becoming a caste based on blood relationship. As I have already pointed out, the Ottoman Sultans created an administrative organization which was to be totally devoted to the person of the Sultan. The Sultan's household and army in the capital consisted almost entirely of men of servile origin (*kuls*), who were sometimes given *timars* in the provinces ; and the Sultan's personal servants were often appointed as governors. This system was believed to guarantee the absolute power of the Sultan <sup>(2)</sup>. By using the *defters* we are able to trace this system at least as far back as the reign of Bayezid I (1389-1403), and no doubt it existed even earlier. The *kul* system existed also among the *timar*-holders in the provinces where the beys had a retinue of slaves with military func-

(1) See *Stefan Duşandan...*, pp. 219-213. According to a *defter* of Sultan-öyüğü of 1467 in the Başvekâlet Archives (Maliye def. N° 8), Mihal Bey possessed Harman-kaya and its neighbouring villages as *timar* or property (*mülk*).

(2) This fundamental institution of the Ottoman empire is adequately emphasized for the 16th century by A. H. Lybyer (*The Government of the Ottoman Empire in the Time of Suleiman the Magnificent*, Cambridge Mass. 1913), who used the contemporary Venetian accounts. The system of *gulâm* or *kul* as such existed before the Ottomans among the Seldjukids of Anatolia, the Mamlûks of Egypt and in the earlier Muslim states. The general practice of this system was as follows : The slaves who were captured in war or bought by the Sultan or the military chiefs were trained as retainers in absolute devotion to the Sultan or the grandees. Even though they were all converted to Islam, they remained bound to their masters. The Ottoman Sultans also recruited children of their Christian subjects for the same purpose. These *kuls* were entrusted with important military and administrative posts and shared governmental responsibilities and authority with their masters who could be certain of their faithfulness. In other words, they became in turn masters themselves. After the Mongol invasion of the Near East the Mongol institution of *nökör* (*nöker*) seems to have influenced the old system of *gulâm* in Central Anatolia. The Yapa family (see above p. 118) had its nomad *nökers* in the 16th century. The word *nöker* is used by the Ottomans as synonymous with *gulâm* in Albania in 1431. At any rate, the *kul* system cannot be explained only by the Islamic institution of *walâ*. The personal attachment of the *kul* was nearer to that of the Mongol *nökör* than to that of the Islamic *mawla*.

tions. The beys' servants and *kuls* (in Persian *gulām*, in Arabic *mamlūk*) could obtain *timars* (1).

On the other hand, the timariots had to maintain and train *cebelūs*, *kuls*, or *nōkers*. It is well known that a great many timariots who possessed comparatively large *timars* were required to provide the army with fixed numbers of fully armed cavalrymen, called *cebelū*, whose number varied according to the rank of the timariot and the amount of his *timar* (2). A *timar*-holder had to furnish a *gulām* for a part of a *timar* which was smaller than that required for a *cebelū*. In this case the *kul* appears to be a simple valet. In fact the difference between *kul* and *cebelū* seemed to lie in their arms and equipment. Both were entitled to obtain *timars* if opportunity arose. At any rate every *timar*-holder from the simple *sipāhī* to the *pasha* in the *Porte* had their own retainers, as in a feudal army. The *kuls* seemed to be directly under their master's command until they were made timariots by the Sultan. Some great Ottoman *uc-beyis* in the distant border zones such as Evrenos Bey, Turahan Bey, Ishak Bey of Usküp (Skoplje) and later their sons had hundreds of *kuls*, and the *timar*-holders in their provinces were much more dependant on them than those in other provinces of the Empire (3). In fact the powerful *uc-beyis* in the Balkans acted somewhat independently and played a major role in the struggle for the throne between Bayezid I's sons and grandsons until the conquest of Constantinople (4). However, because all the *timars* were given directly by the Sultan, these beys were prevented from becoming feudal lords with truly private armies. On the other hand, having the largest group of *kuls*, the Sultan was actually able to check the beys' power. Under Mehmed II the Sultan's

(1) According to the *defter* of Albania of 1431 the *kuls* possessing *timars* outnumbered other groups of timariots.

(2) In the *Kanūnnāme* of Süleyman I the numbers of *cebelūs* and *gulāms* and their equipment are laid down in detail. The uncritical edition by Arif Bey in TOEM contains many omissions and mistakes, and is unreliable.

(3) In 1455 in the *uc* province of Üsküp about 160 out of a total of 189 *timar*-holders were the former servants or *kuls* of Ishak Bey and of his son and successor in the governorship, Isa Bey. See *Fatih Devri üzerinde Tedkikler ve Vesikalar*, p. 149.

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 69.

*kuls* became absolutely predominant all over the empire and the old aristocratic groups as well as the powerful families in the *uc* lost their importance to a large extent. It is also noteworthy that in contrast to the situation before the conquest of Constantinople most of the grand vizirs of Mehmed II were of *kul* origin. In short, the *timar system* and the *kul system*, which was actually a part of the former, enabled the Sultans eventually to prevent the old feudal and aristocratic elements from dominating the Empire at the expense of the central government. This, too, was achieved gradually and completed the slow process of integration of the different elements in the conquered lands by one unified centralist administration under an absolute ruler.

#### (4) *Deportation and Emigration as a Tool of Reorganization.*

In order to make their new conquest secure the Ottomans used an elaborate system of colonization and mass deportation (*sürgün*). The turbulent nomads or the rebellious population of a village and even of a town which had caused or might cause trouble were shifted to a distant part of the Empire. The Ottoman state was also greatly concerned with the settlement of Turkish people in conquered lands.

In the old Ottoman chronicles the account of the first conquests in the Gallipoli peninsula reads : “(Süleyman Pasha, son of Orhan Gâzi, informed his father) that a large Moslem population was needed in these conquered lands and fortresses. He also asked him to send valiant *gâzîs*. Orhan approved and deported to Rum-ili the nomads called Kara Arabs who had come into his territory. New families arrived every day from Karasi. These newcomers settled down and started the *gazâ* (holy war) <sup>(1)</sup>”. We also read : “Süleyman Pasha ordered : Take the Christian military men out of these fortresses (in Europe) and send them to

(1) Ashik Pashazâde, pp. 49-50.

Karasi (in Anatolia) so that they can not give us trouble in the future. And so they were sent" (1).

Such examples of deportation recorded in the chronicles are numerous. Evidently mass deportation was practised by the Ottoman state from the earliest time.

The documents of later periods confirm this old tradition of mass deportation and give interesting details. According to an imperial decree of deportation dated 13 Djumâda I, 980 (24 September 1572) (2) one family out of every ten in the provinces of Anatolia, Rum (Sivas), Karaman and Zulkadriye were to be sent to newly conquered Cyprus. The expressed motives for this particular deportation were the rehabilitation and security of the island. The settlers were to be chosen from every level of the society, peasantry, craftsmen, etc. However, the first people to be sent to the island were peasants with insufficient or unfertile lands, the poor, the idlers and the nomads. These people equipped with their implements were to be registered in the *defters* and transferred to the island. These deportees were given a special exemption from taxation in their new homes for a period of two years. As these people did not usually like to abandon their homes, the officials concerned were ordered to carry out these measures with firmness. At a later date, convicted usurers and criminals were sent to Cyprus as a punishment for their crimes.

The mass deportations by Mehmed II (1451-1481) from Serbia, Albania, Morea and Kaffa to Istanbul are well known. Their chief object was to secure the prosperity of the new capital. A great part of those deported were prisoners of war and were settled in the villages around Constantinople as peasant slaves of the Sultan (3).

An interesting example of mass deportation to a Christian country is the settlement of a large group (1025 families) of

(1) *Ibid.*, p. 49.

(2) See Barkan, *Les déportations comme méthode de peuplement et de colonisation dans l'empire Ottoman*; *Revue de la Fac. des Sc. Econ. Istanbul* XI, 91.

(3) For the slave peasantry and their status see Barkan, in *Revue de la Fac. des Sc. Econ. Istanbul*, N° 1-3 (1939).

Moslem *re'âyâ* from Anatolia in the Bulgarian district of Pravadî. These people were given the special status of *sürgün* (deportees) and formed an independent administrative unit under an officer called *sürgün subashisi*. These people remained distinct until the middle of the 16th century when they appear to have become assimilated to the local *re'âyâ*. An example of deportation to Anatolia (Trebizond) is the forced settlement of a group of Albanians, probably rebellious, in the 15th century. In short, the examples from Ottoman archives corroborate earlier accounts in the chronicles which illustrate the use of mass deportation by the Ottomans as a tool in organizing newly conquered lands.

As has been seen, the status of the resettled population varied according to circumstances. In the first century of their conquests the Ottomans seemed to be interested rather in using deportation for military purposes. During this period a number of nomadic people in Anatolia who had proved troublesome were transferred to the Balkans, and having been settled in the border zones were given a special military status (1). According to the map drawn up by Barkan, who obtained his information from the early 16th century *defters*, these Turkish nomads, militarily organized under the name *yürük*, were found primarily in Thrace, in the Rhodopes and on the Southern slopes of the Balkan mountains (2), in Macedonia and in Dobrudga, all of which were conquered in the second half of the 14th century. Meanwhile, according to the *defter* of Albania, many deportees from several parts of Asia Minor such as Saruhan, Djanik, Paphlagonia, Tarakliborlu (Bolu) and from Vize (in Thrace) were given *timars* in Albania between 1415 and 1430. These deportations undoubtedly were related to the disorders which occurred in Saruhan and Djanik during this period (Sheyh Bedreddin's insurrection and the struggle of Yörgüç Pasha

(1) See, *Sultan Süleyman Kanûnnâmesi*, ed. TOEM, and Barkan, *Osmanlı İmparatorluğunda Ziraî Ekonominin Hukukî ve Mali Esasları*, İstanbul 1943, pp. 260-269. For the Turkish nomads who settled in villages as *re'âyâ* see further below, p. 125.

(2) Barkan, *Les déportations*, pp. 108-119 and map; cf. C. Truhelka *Über die Balkan-Yürüken*, in *Rev. Int. des Etudes Balcaniques*, I, 89-99.

against the nomads in Djanik). Considering also the fact that « the Turkish emigrants from Anatolia who accompanied Evrenos Bey and Turahan Bey » <sup>(1)</sup>, as well as the men led by the famous *uc-beyi* of Üsküp, Pasha-yigit Bey, who had been transferred to Üsküp at the head of the troublesome nomads from Saruhan<sup>(2)</sup>, had been granted *timars* in the conquered lands, we come to the conclusion that in the frontier districts the deportees as warriors were treated in an exceptionally generous way <sup>(3)</sup>.

So far we have tried to show how widely deportation was used by the Ottomans in the organization of the empire. In this connection mention must be made of voluntary emigration to the Balkans. In Ö. L. Barkan's map <sup>(4)</sup>, showing the approximate number and location of Turkish elements, settled or nomadic, on the Balkan peninsula in the 16th century, the Muslims constituted about one fourth of the whole population. Apart from the islamized native Slavs in Bosnia and the Muslim communities centered in and around the fortified towns of the *uc*, such as Nigebolu (Nicopolis), Küstendil, Tirhala, Üsküp (Skoplje), Vidin and Silistre, the Muslim Turks were an overwhelming majority in both Thrace and the region south of the Balkan range. They were settled densely along the two great historical routes of the Peninsula, one going through Thrace and Macedonia to the Adriatic and the other passing through the Maritza and Tundja valleys to the Danube. The *yürüks* were settled mostly in the mountainous parts of that area. We can assert on the strength of the material provided by the *def-ters* of the 15th century that this situation already prevailed in its first half. The village names indicate to some extent the character of the settlements. The names of some villages of the Maritza valley classified in terms of their origins are : 1. Villages named after Turkish nomadic groups such as Kayi, Salurlu,

(1) See *Stefan Duşandan...*, p. 215. The quotation is from the record-book of Tirhala (Thessaly).

(2) See Barkan, *Les déportations*, p. 112.

(3) Under the *timar* system all those who performed conspicuous deeds of war were entitled to receive *timars*.

(4) See above, p. 123 note 2.



Türkmen, Akcakoyunlu. 2. Village names indicating a connexion with districts in Anatolia, such as Saruhanlu, Meteşelü, Simavlu, Hamidlü, Efluganlu. Most of the settlers in these villages must also have been of nomadic origin, as the nomadic groups from a certain area were in general named in the same fashion. 3. A great part of the village names in the Maritza valley and Thrace were derived from the names of famous personalities such as Davud Bey (the village : Davud-Beylü), Turahan Bey (the village : Turahanlu), or Mezid Bey. 4. Many other villages were named after official titles such as Doganci, Turnaci, Chavush, Damgaci, Müderris, Kadi, Sekban, etc. These villages may have been held as *timars* by officials with such titles. 5. Certain villages bore the names of certain persons such as Karaca Resul, Hacı Timurhan, İbrahim Danishmend, Saru Ömer. This group of villages which may have taken their names from their founders or first settlers constituted the majority. 6. Many other villages developed around a *zâviye* (kind of hostel maintained by a dervish) or a pious foundation. These institutions enjoyed certain financial privileges which encouraged the formation of villages in their vicinity. In an important study <sup>(1)</sup> Barkan has mentioned hundreds of such villages and tried to ascertain the nature of their establishment. 7. Finally, we find many villages with Turkish names referring to natural features or economic functions such as Kayacık, Ada, Hisarlu, Yaycılar, Bazarlu, Çömlekci, Gemici, Eskice-bazar, Balci. 8. Villages with Christian names such as Mavri, Makri, Karli, Anahorya, Karbuna, Ostrovica, in districts such as Ipsala, Dimetoka, Gömülcine, Yanbolu, are few in number in the *defters* of the 15th century.

This is not the place to explain the process by which these Turkish villages were established. It should be mentioned, however, that the Turks from Anatolia established separate villages in their new lands and did not usually mix with the native Christian population. According to the census made in

(1) *İstila Devrinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri*, in *Vakıflar Dergisi* II, Ankara 1942.

the 15th Century which gives us the names of the people in the towns and villages, the population in these new villages was exclusively Muslim. Even in the cities such as Gallipoli, Adrianople (Edrine), Üsküp, Tirhala, Serez (Serres) which were considerably enlarged by new Turkish arrivals, the Christians were confined to their own separate quarters <sup>(1)</sup>. The few Muslims found in the Christian villages or districts were probably converts. Moreover in the Balkans new towns with an entirely Turkish population, for instance Yenishehir (New-town) in Thessaly, were established.

This pattern of settlement leads us to think that the Muslim population of these areas consisted of Turkish emigrants from Anatolia rather than of native converts. There was apparently a comparative over-population in Western Anatolia about the 14th century, and the rich lands in the West attracted emigrants from the Asiatic hinterland where anarchy had prevailed after the decline of the Ilkhanid domination <sup>(2)</sup>. That Western Anatolia, which had been conquered by the *gâzî* principalities approximately between 1270 and 1330, <sup>(3)</sup> had an overwhelming Turkish majority in the 14th century is confirmed by an Ottoman *defter* of 1455 <sup>(4)</sup>. (It appears that the Turkicising of Western Anatolia had followed the same process as that of the Balkans in the 15th century, and was due not to a mass conversion to Islam but rather to large-scale Turkish settlement). Now it is generally admitted that this movement extended over Thrace following the Ottoman conquests. This assertion is

(1) According to the *defter* of Üsküp dated 1455, there were 8 Christian and 22 Moslem districts in the city (Başvekalet Archives, Maliye def. N° 12).

(2) See F. Köprülü, *Les Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*, p. 33-78, and Z. V. Togan, *Umumi Türk Tarihine Giriş*, Istanbul 1946.

(3) These *gâzî* states in Western Anatolia, the last of which was the Ottoman state, are masterly described by P. Wittek in his study *Das Fürstentum Mentesche, Studie zur Geschichte Westkleinasiens im 13-15 Jahrh.*, Istanbul 1934, and in his *Rise of the Ottoman Empire*. F. Köprülü in his various studies has thrown light on the internal factors in the Turkish hinterland (a summary of these studies is found in his *Origines de l'Empire Ottoman*). Both authors stress the emigration and the overpopulation on the Seldjukid-Byzantine frontier zones as a major cause of the Turkish invasion of Western Anatolia. The contemporary author Gregoras (I, 137) emphasized this.

(4) Başvekalet Archives, Tapu def. N° 1, Aydin.

confirmed to some extent by the records on deportees which I have mentioned. But the extensive Turkish colonization in Thrace and the Maritza valley can be explained only by a spontaneous emigration from Anatolia and not by a mass deportation. The oldest Ottoman tradition records <sup>(1)</sup> that Timur's invasion of Anatolia in 1402 caused a new influx of Turkish population into the Balkans ; it states explicitly : "Then a great number of people belonging to the Arabs, Kurds and Türkmen (nomads), and from (the settled population of) Anatolia spread over Rum-ili... it is true that the (Muslim) population of Rum-ili came originally from Anatolia".

In the first decades of their conquests the Ottomans undoubtedly encouraged voluntary emigration into the Balkans of the people who were daily coming in increasing numbers into their territories from all parts of Anatolia and the rest of the Islamic world. Military and financial considerations <sup>(2)</sup> as well as the obligation of settling surplus population made necessary a policy of colonization. In this connection emphasis must be put on the military importance of the Turkish population in that first period of the Ottoman state when a great part of the army was recruited among the Turks in towns as well as villages under the names of *'azab* and *yaya*, respectively. These Turkish soldiers continued to play an important part in the Ottoman army until the 16th century. The documents from the Ottoman archives show that only in the areas ruled by the Ottomans in the 14th Century was the *yaya* military organization extensively established, and the most important area was Eastern Thrace and the Maritza Valley where in Chirmen (Cher-

(1) *Tevârih-i Al-i Osmân*, ed. Fr. Giese (Breslau 1922), text, pp. 45-46 ; another version, edited by I. H. Ertaylan (Istanbul 1946), p. 70.

(2) The Ottoman government was most concerned with the extension of cultivated lands and the establishing of new villages in order to increase the state revenues and thus be able to create new *timars*. (See my *Stefan Duşandan...*, p. 239, note 121). The essential duty of the *tahrîr emîni* was to find or to create such sources of revenue (*ifrazât* and *şenletme*). The emins of Mehmed II and Süleyman the Magnificent were particularly active in increasing this type of additional revenue which corresponded to the great extension of the timariot army in the provinces.

manon) a commander-in-chief of these Turkish *yaya* was posted (1).

It is also interesting to note that this spontaneous emigration of Turkish masses into the Balkans slackened toward the middle of the 15th century, and Turkish colonization beyond the Rhodope and Balkan ranges was confined to some military centres of the *uc* and composed mostly of populations deported by the state.

HALIL İNALCIK.

(Ankara)

(1) See my *Arvanid Defteri*, p. vi.

# Osman's Dream

*The Story of the Ottoman Empire 1300–1923*

CAROLINE FINKEL



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